CHINA-SOUTH CHINA SEA: MILITARY BUILD-UP
|
Dr Ross Babbage, Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum Pty Ltd and Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington DC who has also formerly held the position of Head of Strategic Analysis in Australia's Office of National Assessments and Assistant Secretary for ANZUS and then Force Development in the Department of Defence, on December 28, 2016 wrote that Beijing’s footprint has expanded markedly in the South China Sea during the last five years. He said 'Beijing’s campaign has been cleverly conducted via a succession of modest incremental steps, each of which has fallen below the threshold that would trigger a forceful Western response' and Beijing now has significant facilities on 12 islands in the South China Sea. He listed these as surveillance and intelligence gathering facilities, long-range anti-aircraft and anti-ship missile installations, and numerous missile and gun point-defense systems. Three of the islands in the Spratly group, towards the middle of the South China Sea, now possess 10,000 foot airfields that are more than adequate to handle Boeing 747 operations. Hardened revetments to house 24 fighter-bomber aircraft are nearing completion on these three islands together with what appear to be extensive maintenance and storage facilities for fuel and other supplies. Aircraft operating from these facilities could range as far as the Andaman Sea, Northern Australia, and Guam'. He said These newly created islands also appear to have capacities to house, as well as operate at short notice, significant numbers of short-and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles with capabilities to strike both land-based targets and ships at sea as far away as the Sulu Sea in the Philippines and Singapore and Malaysia to the south. Port facilities have also been built on these islands capable of refuelling and replenishing significant numbers of naval, coastguard, and maritime militia vessels. In addition, these islands appear to have the potential to support an underwater acoustic surveillance network across the South China Sea that would significantly enhance China’s capabilities to prosecute operations against allied submarines in the theater.
Because these three primary islands are not very small, there is space to disperse most deployed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) assets in a crisis and complicate targeting by allied forces. Fiery Cross Reef is now about the size of a mainland fighter base. Subi Reef is about 50 percent larger and roughly comparable in area to Pearl Harbor Naval Base. Mischief Reef is substantially larger again and would barely fit within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. In consequence, China appears well on the way to converting the South China Sea into something approaching a heavily defended internal waterway.
At present, innocent passage, especially by commercial vessels, is being respected. However, Beijing is making clear that the terms and conditions of foreign activity, even by other littoral states, will be determined and enforced by China. Relevant Chinese authorities have signalled that Beijing is considering the declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the entire South China Sea. Military facilities now nearing completion will permit Chinese forces to enforce any such declaration with fighter intercepts of non-complying aircraft.
|