Another article published in Guoji Luntan (No. 5, 2021), Li Qingyan, Associate Research Fellow at the
Department for Developing Countries Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, explored US
efforts to incorporate India into its Indo-Pacific strategy, which he said is motivated by the U.S. desire to
contain China, and Indian motivations for pursuing closer ties with the United States, and the inherent limits
to US–Indian relations. He said under Modi, India has shifted from its traditional “non-alignment” policy to a “multi-alignment” approach that emphasizes building strategic relations with multiple great powers.
Politically, the United States, operating under what Li criticizes as flawed zero-sum Cold War thinking,
views India as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. India is happy to acquiesce to the Indo-Pacific
strategy because it views cooperation with the United States as a way to achieve its great power ambitions.
Consequently, India has increased its dialogues and cooperation with the members of the Quad. In the
security field, the United States regards India as a “defence partner” and treats it much as it would treat a
formal ally. The two countries share technology and some intelligence, have worked to integrate military
operations, and participate in joint military exercises. Li Qingyan contends that India and the United States
have teamed up to oppose the Belt and Road Initiative, painting its projects as “debt traps” and “neocolonialism,” and promoting their own initiatives as an alternative. Despite the strengthening of US–Indian
relations, however, Li asserts that geopolitical, security, and economic differences will hinder the
development of formal alliance relations. US–Indian relations are limited by conflicting objectives and a
lack of mutual trust. India participates in the Indo-Pacific strategy not because it wants to take the United
States’ side in the US–China strategic competition, but because India views cooperation with the strategy
as the best way to achieve its great power ambitions and establish its regional significance as the world
transitions to multipolarity. He points to India's continuing purchase of weapons from Russia and trade
frictions that are undermining Indian–US relations. Li Qingyan anticipates continued tension between US
policies first developed under Trump’s “America First” approach and those promoted by Modi’s “Made in
India” strategy of domestic protectionism. He argues, the “China factor” is not enough to push the United
States and India toward alliance relations: India remains unwilling to sacrifice its strategic autonomy for
US interests. India’s willingness to cooperate with the United States is motivated by India’s perception that
China poses a threat to India’s regional dominance and its global influence. Li Qingyan argues, this analysis
is completely flawed; if India “abandons ‘strategic autonomy’” and aligns with anti-Chinese elements in
the West, it will lose its opportunity to become a great power. He contends that over the long term, China
and India as emerging markets with enormous populations have many common interests and face similar
development challenges, which might push the two countries closer together. The two countries have
extensive trade relations. They also share the view that the Global South should have a far greater say in
global economic governance than it currently does and anticipate that their countries will play increasingly
significant roles as the world transitions toward a multipolar order. Furthermore, Li Qingyan expects India’s
decision to pursue closer relations with the United States for geopolitical reasons to shift over the longer
term. He expects that the United States and China will eventually learn to coexist in a multipolar world,
decreasing India’s opportunity to advance its own interests by playing off China and the United States
against each other, and strengthening the value of strategic autonomy. Li Qingyan predicts that the IndoPacific strategy ultimately will fall away as China and India rise together.
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