Ling Li, a Researcher on East Asian Economy and Society, Department of East Asian
Studies, University of Vienna, wrote an 'explainer' on the 20th Party Congress for the Diplomat
(September 1, 2022). Its main points: When we talk about succession of the Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC), we should not conflate and treat all candidates as the same but separate
them into three groups because these groups enjoy different levels of privileges. Sitting PBSC
members enjoy more privileges than aspiring candidates from outside of the PSC. A PBSC
member enjoys extendable tenure unless he a) is unseated through the disciplinary procedure,
b) voluntarily retires or c) reaches the age limit (most notably since 2002). a) is extremely
difficult. b) rarely happens. c) is currently the only operating mechanism that regulates the exits
of the PBSC members. Hence, it is very valuable to keep it alive for the operation of the Party
to avoid gerontocracy. Age limit (7up8down) is the only observable pattern of the exits of PBSC members since 2002. All sitting PBSC members at or above 68 at the time of election
had retired. All at 67 or below stayed, with no exception. There are cases where age-qualified
Politburo members failed to retain their seats. But that's not aberrant & doesn't necessarily
contradict the age limit rule because they don't have the privilege of PBSC members & age is
not the only factor that regulates their exits. Consent-engineering at the voting sites is only one
method to ensure the electoral outcome. The more impactful measures but least discussed are
campaign restrictions. These measures together ensure predictable electoral outcomes at the
Congress. I identify the Standing Committee of the Chairman-League of the Party Congress
(SCOCL) as the official collective body that approves the nominations of Central Committee
members. SCOCL has around 40 members but its size is not fixed. Regular members of the
SCOCL are comprised of all sitting members of the Politburo, the PBSC, and the Central
Secretariat. Since 2002, all living retired and not purged PBSC members have also enjoyed a
seat at the SCOCL. I suspect that this very mechanism, namely, to allow retiring and retired
PSC members a say in the selection of future leaders, is perhaps the secret behind the peaceful
power succession that has been widely acknowledged by China observers. Lastly, I stress that
institutions are of pivotal importance for the Party because institutions are appreciated by the
Party for its enabling function as much as they are appreciated for its power-constraining
function elsewhere
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