CHINA-LEADERSHIP: CMC VICE CHAIRMAN GENERAL XU QILIANG PUBLISHES ARTICLE IN PEOPLE'S DAILY
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The People's Daily (November 7) published a lengthy article by CMC Vice Chairman Xu
Qiliang captioned 'Achieving the goal of the army's centenary struggle as scheduled
(conscientiously study, publicize and implement the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the
Party)'. It called for adhering to the "party's absolute leadership over the people's army, fully
and thoroughly implement the responsibility system of the chairman of the military
commission", and continually innovating "military strategic guidance, strengthen strategic
forces and new combat forces in new areas, promote practical training step by step, effectively
respond to external military challenges, and deter". It added "The "Taiwan Independence"
separatist forces have strengthened border control and anti-encroachment struggles, carried out
major tasks such as safeguarding rights at sea, countering terrorism and maintaining stability,
creating a favourable situation for military struggles". Xu Qiliang said, "Our army's
modernization level and actual combat capability have been significantly improved". He
reiterated that "As the world enters a new period of turbulence and change, China's national
security situation is becoming more unstable and uncertain, and we are facing many security
challenges in all directions and fields. We must strengthen our military capabilities so as to
stabilize and control the situation in peacetime and fight decisive battles in wartime. Only by
winning a decisive victory can we secure the bottom line of national security and maintain the
strategic initiative in the changing international situation". "The 20th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China made a strategic plan to achieve the goal of the army's centenary
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struggle as scheduled, which contains clear political, strategic, and practical orientations, and
ultimately it must be aimed at improving the ability to win in an all-round way." He stressed
"Build a high-level strategic deterrence and joint operations system. The strategic deterrence
system is the "ballast stone" of the game of great powers. It is necessary to adhere to
asymmetric checks and balances, insist on doing something and refraining from doing
something, insist on focusing on developing what the enemy is afraid of, strengthen strategic
forces, increase strategic weight, and improve effective deterrence of the enemy. The military
strength of the enemy. The joint combat system is an important guarantee for winning modern
wars. It is necessary to build a smooth and efficient joint combat command system, build a
joint combat force system with elite combat forces as the main body, strengthen the basic
support of the network information system, and promote reconnaissance, early warning, and
joint strikes., battlefield support, comprehensive support system and capacity building, and
accelerate the improvement of joint combat capabilities and overall combat capabilities. The
role of command confrontation in modern warfare has risen unprecedentedly. It is necessary to
build a strong military commission and theatre level joint operations command organization,
improve the command operation mechanism, develop advanced command methods, and
improve command efficiency." Discussing S&T in the PLA, he said "At present, a new round
of scientific and technological revolution and military revolution is developing rapidly, and
strategic high-tech groups are bursting out. Judging from the recent local wars and military
operations in the world, a large number of intelligent unmanned combat systems have been put
into actual combat, and new combat capabilities have become a key variable in changing the
rules of war. We must do a good job of systematic planning, speed up the development of
strategic, cutting-edge, and disruptive technologies, strengthen key military intelligence core
technologies, key software and hardware, and basic theoretical research, and build an
intelligent military system with our army's characteristics."
(Comment: i) Commenting on the article M. Taylor Fravel observes that: Importantly, the
article describes 2027 as part of a new “three step strategy” for national defense and military
modernization, along with basically achieving modernization in 2035 and becoming world
class by mid-century or 2049. This is strong evidence that the PLA has not accelerated its
modernization effort. Instead, the article notes that 2027, 2035 and 2049 contain the “shot-term,
medium-term and long-term goals for strengthening the military in the new era.” Thus, the
2027 remains a waypoint for achieving the 2035 and 2049 benchmarks for modernization that
were first established at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, not something new. Of course,
making progress in the next five years is important. Xu describes China’s external security
environment as becoming “more unstable and uncertain with many challenges in all directions
and domains.” These challenges increase the importance of military power “to stabilize the
situation in peacetime and win a decisive war in wartime.” Continuing to make progress by
2027 matters. The article then notes five lines of effort that need to be pursued. These include
strategic and operational guidance, understanding new domains, and training. I’d like to focus
on two other ones that he notes: One is to “To build a high-level strategic deterrence and joint
warfare system.” Sidebar note: for the PLA, strategic deterrence is not a synonym for nuclear
weapons but any kind of capability such as strategic reserves that can be used to achieve a
strategic goal through deterrence. Specifically, Xu described strategic deterrence as the "ballast
stone" of great power politics and called for China's strategic deterrence system to highlight
"asymmetric checks and balances" while focusing on what the adversary fears. However, Xu
spent much more time discussing the need to improve joint operations. This suggests that
despite the reforms from 2016 many challenges remain. Xu also makes an interesting reference
to strengthening joint command organs at both the CMC and theatre command levels. A second
area Xu highlights is the need create a system to integrate the PLA’s ability to “struggle,
prepare, and build.” This refers to the challenges of deploying forces, maintaining readiness
and further modernizing / building of forces. Xu foreshadows greater employment of the PLA
but also a recognition of the need to “make up for the shortcomings of our army’s combat
system,” implying this will be hard to do while also needing to maintain readiness and continue
modernization. Xu had tough words for Taiwan, but the essay did not reflect a PLA that
believed it has achieved sufficient capability for major military action—or would do so soon.
Instead, it stressed the challenges of continuing to modernize amid the intense requirements of
modern war. Indeed, Xu describes the next five years as a “critical stage for improving quality
and efficiency.” Thus, Xu highlights strengthening party leadership, strategic management,
reform and innovation, personnel, and an integrated national strategic system and capability.
ii) My comments: Fravel's observation that the PLA has "not accelerated its modernization
effort" is debatable. There is enough open-source material to suggest that it has and, more
importantly, that following the 20th Party Congress these efforts will be stepped up. Secondly,
the tasking to the PLA by the 20th Party Congress to complete modernisation by 2027 is
significant. While modernisation is an ongoing process, what the Chinese authorities probably
mean is attaining the mandated level of "mechanisation, informationisation and
intelligentisation." Xi Qiliang has dwelt on joint operations and strengthening joint command
operations. His comments regarding Taiwan are pertinent.)
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